Corporate Planning (Case) ICL’s Experience of Building Scenarios Source: Ringland, G. (1998). Scenario planning: Managing for the future. Chichester, UK: Wiley. ISBN 0-471-97790-X. (Chapter 4) [Added on Jul 28, 2004] "ICL was formed in 1968 by merging the UK's leading indigenous computer suppliers, English Electric Computers and International Computers and Tabulators (ICT). In 1984, ICL was acquired by STC (Standard Telephones and Cables) for approximately £430m to form one of Europe's leading communications and information systems groups. 1984 was the year ICL was last listed on the London Stock Exchange. At the end of November 1990, Fujitsu Limited acquired an 80 per cent shareholding in the company for £700m; Nortel Networks (formerly known as Northern Telecom) held the 20 per cent balance. By virtue of two rights issues in 1993-94 and 1996, Fujitsu increased its stake to 90.1 per cent. ICL closed its last manufacturing site in 1996 with the sale of D2D computer manufacturing business to Celestica of Canada and de-merger of PC and server business to Fujitsu. In September 1998 Fujitsu acquired the 9.9 per cent balance from Nortel Networks. Fujitsu therefore owned 100 per cent of ICL. In April 2002 ICL was fully intergrated into the Fujitsu Group of companies and became known as Fujitsu Services within the UK and Europe." Source: <http://uk.fujitsu.com/about/jobs/tupe/introduction/> A FIRST SCENARIO PLANNING PROJECT: MOVING UP THE LEARNING CURVE ICL first began experimenting with scenario planning in 1993. It was part of a comprehensive examination of the forces on the information technology (IT) industry, and a re-examination of ICL’s vision of the future. Vision 2000 Like many other companies in the IT industry, ICL had been growing within an industry with double digit growth most years for more than a decade. But the growth masked major changes in the industry. By 1993, looking back to the ten-year forecasts made in 1986, we could see that what we had correctly foreseen was that the industry was moving towards personal computers and systems integration. What we had not foreseen was the extent to which the industry would restructure and new players dominate niches, and how far margins would decrease as the industry restructured. So we decided that we needed to take a systematic look ahead to see what opportunities and potential dangers were lying in wait for our business. We set up a project called Vision 2000 as a first step in investigating the possible futures ICL faced, to concentrate on forces in the industry and the ways in which we could meet the challenges of the changing needs of our customers. We began the project quite informally, involving mainly three people. The author had an HQ responsibility for software and services, Malcolm Austin headed corporate planning, and Tony Oppenheim was mainly concerned with mergers and acquisitions. There were three strands to Vision 2000: One was looking at the outside world, the conventional PEST (politics, economics, society, technical) factors. It was a question of gathering statistics and information, trying to concentrate on what were the megatrends, such as what was happening in the US as opposed to Asia, what is happening to demographics – to get a feeling and a reach for the wider environment. The second strand was analysing the IT industry, looking for discontinuities in sectors like consumer electronics and telecommunications, examining the competition, and listening to who was saying what about future business directions. Because we sensed that what had been perceived as a monolithic computer business was splitting up, we turned to the PIMS database to look for other industrial parallels for the different components of the IT industry. We used the construction industry as a comparison for our business that dealt with large projects, we looked at utilities for their resemblance to the services business, and consumer electronics for the products/technology-based business. In each case we charted operating profits, the return on investment, investment required and the management profiles. The third strand was to understand ICL’s assets; after exploring several techniques we decided on a SWOT analysis of the ICL assets, business by business. At this level, we were able to separate out ICL corporate assets from those unique to a particular business – for instance, the infrastructure across Europe versus applications software for instore retail systems. The scenario planning project At the same time as we were pushing ahead on Vision 2000, we were experimenting with scenario planning to judge how effective an approach it could be in helping the company inform decisions about its direction. Our interest was sparked by Matti Keiola, on secondment to corporate planning for a year from ICL Finland. He brought a number of methodologies and tools which he wanted to pilot. For example, he created a large model of the company by aggregating data from the business units to help analyse the business as a whole. Another technique was business value (see chapter 3). Both methods are still in use. He also led a scenario planning exercise, involving the Vision 2000 group. We met about once a week over ten weeks. The meetings were held in the office and consisted three scenarios, with each one set in the context of a number of basic driving forces: general geo-economic/political conditions, world GDP, growth, monetary system/Europe, price stability (especially energy), armed conflicts (defence spending), telecommunications harmonization and what might happen in the integration or otherwise of Europe. THE THREE SCENARIOS We called the three scenarios Stagnation, Baseline and Technogrowth.
Trends common to all three scenarios
When this is carried through into predictions for systems, we anticipated a major growth in the use of palmtop computers, with prices starting at $100, and added capability like modems, pen input, pushing up the price. By the year 2000 we expected that desktops (for home and business) would start at $300. Added capability like ISDN connection capability, modem cards, multimedia cards and CD-ROMs would push up the average prices. The price expected on current trends in server prices by year 2000 was $2000/tps (transactions per second). This compared with the 1993 prices for mainframes of $35-50,000/tps. We thought that printers would increase in capability and relative price within the system. We expected that networking bandwidth would increase and the price decrease, but that in Europe interactive video bandwidths delivered to the home would not be widespread in the time frame of year 2000. Figure 4.2 [The figure shows revenue and market-share of top IT suppliers, namely IBM, Fujitsu, Digital Equipment, NEC, Hitachi, HP, EDS, Apple, Olivetti, Groups Bull, Unisys, AT&T, Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, and Siemens. Period covered 1987-2002. Source: Gartner Group] IT Industry Based on the view of Gartner Group (Figure 4.2) we assumed the IT industry would continue to grow. Gartner estimated that by 2002, 57% of industry sales – then worth $430 billion – would be dominated by the major players, although IBM’s share would be less than in 1992. Growth would be accompanied by more fragmentation, with more companies entering the market. Intel’s view in 1992 was that a new computer industry would be formed, with a different value chain from that seen historically. The number of competitors in the various areas of the computer industry such as micro-processors and computer platforms would decrease (Figure 4.3) as large IT companies became less vertically-integrated. Figure 4.3 [Intel's view of the 'new computer industry'. The figure shows the relative market-shares of various companies occupying specific positions in the 5 layers of the new computer industry: L1: Microprocessor; L2: Computer Platforms; L3: Operating Systems Software; L4: Applications; L5: Distribution. Source: Intel] Finally, and perhaps more significantly, it was becoming clear that the boundaries between once distinct sectors of the information industry would increasingly shift, with computers and telecommunications moving closer together. The same trend applied to computers and entertainment, media and publishing, distribution, education, consumer electronics, and office equipment. Figure 4.4 is a diagram based on work at Harvard University, provoked by the extent to which semiconductor technology and embedded intelligence was coming to dominate other information industries. Figure 4.4 [The figure shows the merging boundaries between various aspects of the IT industry. Source: Apple] COMMUNICATION OF THE SCENARIOS At the end of the scenario building project, the team had a much clearer view of the world and the underlying trends affecting us. But we had great difficulty in communicating this clarity. The first problem was that initially the scenarios were presented in table from, spread over three pages in very small type. These took several hours to talk through in detail and we did not have a useful summary form. We had been discussing the Vision 2000 work with SRI International, and tapped into its scenarios expertise. It had found that a useful analytic framework for scenarios in technology based industries was using the axes of consumer needs/demands, business needs/demands, the macro-environment and delivery structures. When we rated each of the three scenarios in terms of the rate of change (very high, high, medium, low) on these axes we produced Figure 4.5. This approach helped to begin to tease out the significant difference among the scenarios. They had acquired a different characteristic footprint and could no longer be thought of as “high/baseline/low”. The Technogrowth scenario showed high or very high rate of change in consumer and business demands, but only medium economic growth in Europe. The Baseline scenario was very low in terms of changing delivery structures. It had medium growth of consumer needs/demands, static or declining business needs/demands and a less healthy macro-environment in terms of growth. In the Stagnation scenario, business needs/demands would be very high, but it would be about reducing costs, with particular demand for outsourcing. Consumer demand would be very flat, while the macro-environment was low growth and delivery structures were relatively stable. Figure 4.5 Using these scenarios we were able to discuss a number of aspects of the industry we had not explored before from this angle. They allowed us to make mental jumps and examine how different elements are connected and predict that some areas would be more resilient than others. For example, we could see that outsourcing could be viable when the economy booms because people had discretion to rethink their business, and it could be viable when the economy was bad because people were trying to get efficiencies. So outsourcing would be driven by different forces in different scenarios. Though that was not a devastating conclusion, it was a useful one at the time. This format highlighted the differences between the scenarios and helped us in discussing them with management teams. But they did not “live”, and it proved difficult to include the scenarios into planning. However, on the whole, we were happy with what we had learned from the pilot. Lesson learned
OUTCOME OF VISION 2000
The conclusions, particularly on Internet, were formative in our decision-making over the next year, and provided input to the next scenarios project. A SECOND SCENARIO PLANNING PROJECT IN 1995 Late in 1994 we talked to Laura Raymond of Shell about our views of the IT industry. In return the Shell scenarios team under Ged Davies briefed us on how they do scenario planning. Much of this has now been published by Kees van der Heijden. In particular, their emphasis on the importance of credible scenarios which could plausibly evolve from “where we are now” was very helpful. And we took their advice on the number of scenarios to generate. HOW MANY SCENARIOS? Shell had experimented with four, three, and two scenarios for strategic planning. What it had found was that: This approach is very different from the “baseline, high, low” approach, in that it concentrates on creating credible, but different, worlds for each scenario. Meanwhile, since 1993 we had established a better framework for our futures work. This was to participate in external collaborations and consortia, with the aim of extending the range of ideas accessible to us: and to use scenarios as one way of “packaging” the most important ideas in the best way to help managers and planners in ICL to think about the future (Figure 4.6.) Figure 4.6. We investigated a number of sources of inspiration and ideas and discussion of the forces on the world. Two organizations in particular proved very helpful in extending our vision: Global Business Network (GBN). This is an organization that aims to provide senior people in industry with stimulus through unusual ways of looking at the world and the future. One of the services provided is the "Network" of remarkable people; another is a bi-monthly mailing of a book selection. GBN was extremely useful in helping us to think about the social and individual context of the future. SRI (Business in the Third Millennium). BIT3M is a programme planned to run over five years, to examine the effect of IT on business through its effect on consumers, government, and society. It has sponsors like ourselves in Europe, and also in the US and Asia, since one of the aspects we are interested in is the cultural differences in the use of IT. One of the useful early outputs was a report on the nature and timescale of the IT infrastructure – what will these networks look like and when? The programme is run by SRI. Methodology In planning our methodology we investigated several sources: GBN – which also runs training courses, and holds workshops several times per year. Battelle Institute – Which focuses around the health sciences/chemical industry axis, but has a general purpose methodology. SRI – which has a well developed methodology and consulting practice. IDON – which has a methodology oriented towards interactive, short timescale workshops, and a consulting practice. Strategic Planning Society – which runs training workshops and conferences on topics including scenario planning. The best overall guide to process that we found was the checklist in Peter Schwartz’s The Art of the Long View. CHECKLIST FOR DEVELOPING SCENARIOS Step One: Identify Focal Issue or Decision Step Two: Key Forces in the Local Environment Step Three: Driving Forces Step Four: Rank by Importance and Uncertainty Step Five: Selecting the Scenario Logics Step Six: Fleshing out the Scenarios Step Seven: Implications Step Eight: Selection of Leading Indicators and Signposts STARTING THE PROJECT Scenarios for Information Markets in 2005 Why Information Markets? It had become clear to us that an information industry was being formed from the computer, telecoms, education and entertainment industries. We felt that the impact of this would revolutionize our markets over the next decade, as microprocessors have revolutionized the computer and electronic industries over the last decade Why 2005? Our corporate planning period, the timescale over which the individual business plan, is three years. We plan at HQ over five years. What we wanted to do was to take a timescale that would not allow us to extrapolate forward, that was long enough to look afresh, but was not beyond imagination. In addition, to change the culture of a company of ICL’s size takes ten years. So we voted for 2005. Who would use the Scenarios? The purpose of the project was to provide a framework for analysing the ICL portfolio, and for orienting it towards the areas in which our customers would be looking for help. This meant that one audience was the Managing Directors and headquarters staff concerned with strategic planning. However, we decided that we also wanted the output to be accessible to managers who make day to day decisions; in ICL these manage units of 30-100 people. A crucial step was to decide just what questions we wanted to answer about the future to help us in this. But even before that we had to gather a group together to do the project. The process we planned to follow was as shown in Figure 4.7. In some environments it might be more suitable for a senior management team, or management team of a business unit, to engage in the process. What we decided was best to meet our aims was pull together a group of staff from HQ who could work with the businesses to explain and exploit the scenarios once they had been created, if necessary modify or extend them, and explore the implications. Figure 4.7 The group consisted of : Steve and Paul had done a short project (SIM 2020) earlier in the year to look at the changes in the telecom industry: this was part of our background database. In fact, networking and the changes associated with increased bandwidth and decreased cost had the same central technology push role in the 1995 project that the decreasing price of processing had in the 1993 project. We wanted the group to encompass diversity but also be reasonably empathetic to the concerns of the company, so that the company’s assumptions and concerns were a central part of the scenario-building exercise. We decided to take the risk that having mainly ICL people might mean that important issues remained unidentified because of cultural blindness, since we wanted to explore the process, the methods, and crucially, how to use the scenarios with the two audiences, the HQ staff, and line managers. The main project to build the scenarios ran over three months, with the group meeting twice a week for half a day, as well as carrying out research between meetings. No outside consultants were used, although we did discuss some of the outcomes during the project with Professor Gareth Price of the St. Andrews’ Institute of Management. The scale of the project seems typical of those creating broad spectrum scenarios, and is qualitatively different from that needed for the workshops used to create common vision and vocabulary and for team building. And since we were concerned to link to corporate planning we focused on two “near in” scenarios, rather than more diverse scenarios. DEFINING THE QUESTION One of the scenario team, Jane Dowsett, carried out a round of interviews with some 50 senior staff, both old timers and those new to ICL. Some were carried out over the phone, other were face to face. They were normally timed at half an hour: some interviewees got interested and discussed a range of ideas for several hours, others lasted only twenty minutes.
The interviews had two objectives: to get management buy-in for the project and to understand what was the burning question for the organization.
The interview process referred to many external trends and other areas where staff were uncertain. Many of these could have come from a search of the literature. However by asking ICL senior management we were able to ensure they had covered what they considered as the key uncertainties for ICL. The resultant scenarios would then be relevant and challenging but not “shocking” enough to get in the way of their use.
Figure 4.8 Developing the list of relevant factors We added to the 60 factors that the interviewees had identified a number from our researches, e.g. the effect of 2 billion teenagers. We categorized the factors as either trends or uncertainties. A view of the trends is derived from the best available sources, and from wide agreement. “Uncertainties” in the jargon, are “factors over which there are major question marks”. So, for instance, the continuing increase in processing power at a given price is a trend. However, it is uncertain whether consumers will switch from TV to PCs as a result. The trends were collated from a number of sources and reflected “best educated guesses” about directions. These would be common to all the scenarios. A judgement was taken on which trends were already incorporated in ICL’s thinking and processes. For instance, the decreasing role of national governments in Europe and the increasing reliability of hardware are all significant, but perhaps no longer needed spelling out. Even with a well-understood trend, there could be surprises in the pace at which the trends would develop. So that forecasting, even based on trends, is a fraught exercise. Figure 4.9 THE TRENDS Trends are more likely to be seen in two areas: those related to demographics and those related to technology. While surprises can occur – for instance between censuses in the US, the size and pattern of Catholic immigrant families changed the predicted demographic balance significantly – these are rarer than in the political or social arenas. Economic/Geographic Trends 1. Increasingly sophisticated and demanding customers. More and more educated consumers ask for up-to-date, high performance and competitive products. The mass market will be fragmented into many niches. Competition will be fierce and based on price and quality of service. 2. Growth is South East Asia/India/China, with an expanding middle class. In 2010, the middle class in South East Asia (about 700 million) will be larger than that of Europe (about 300 million) and the Americas (about 200 million) combined. 3. Two billion teenagers. In 2001, there will be two billion teenagers world-wide, most of them in Asia and Latin America. That is fifty times the number of teenagers in America in the peak years of the baby boom. Many of them will be in constant contact with each other through technology. 4. Increase in the older population in industrial countries. Medical advances and better life conditions leads to the ageing of the population, mainly in developed countries where the birth rates are low. The demographic shift to an ageing population will require adjustment in many service industries like healthcare, leisure and travel. As the costs of the elderly, particularly with health, increases, service industries and government will look for areas of productivity through IT. 5. Continuous restructuring of corporations. The restructuring of corporations will be dominated by the following trends: globalization of markets, outsourcing of non-strategic jobs, and investments directed to the regions which offer the best profit potential. An increasing number of small companies will be linked through networks. Competition for customers will be intense and delocalized 6. Outsourcing of IT is used by half of all Fortune 500 companies. This trend will change the structure of the IT industry: there will be large potential growth for outsourcing and technology used as a support of outsourcing businesses. 7. Increasing environmental concerns. More environmental concerns force companies on occasion to do business differently. It has positive implications in the sense of more business and some negative ones with possible increases in production costs to conform to environmental pressures. Technology-Related Trends 1. Bandwidth explosion and development of the Internet. Large infrastructure investments to increase cable and wireless networks. Both the volume of traffic increase due to price decreases, and the opportunities for exploiting high bandwidth networking. The Internet continues to grow. 2. Processing power increases and processing becomes pervasive. Moore’s law of the power of processing on a chip doubling every 18 months continues to apply for products shipped over the next decade. New generation of more powerful microprocessors emerge. However, the costs of developing those new chips are high. Processing will be used in more mission-critical applications. There will be an increasing use of embedded systems, and more IT devices will be available. 3. Ease of use. Computers and electronic devices will be more and more friendly. 4. Digitalization of content and growth of multimedia. Information is held digitally, whether context is text, video or audio. Games, videos, media will be delivered either on electronic storage as and alternative to paper, or increasingly through on-line services. 5. Changes in sources of value added in the IT industry. As the industry matures, IT will be increasingly embedded in products. New sources of value added relate to ease of use, access, information security etc. 6. Litigation in IT increases. The risk of IT providers of being sued for misperformance or non-performance increases. 7. Semiconductor content of electronics increases. The content of electronics devices changes from 7% semiconductor to 27% semiconductor over 15 years to 2000. This changes the power and added value in the information industry. DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTIES Scenarios are constructed from a number of trends – as above – and a number of uncertainties. For instance, while the change in processing power or bandwidth is clearly a trend, the question of whether a consumer market will open up can be treated as an uncertainty: we need to think about the effects if it does, or if it does not. Figure 4.10 represents this difference, using as an example our core uncertainty – will customers want to take advantage of the technically feasible innovations or will there be a backlash? Figure 4.11 shows the factors that we regarded as uncertain, and how we grouped them. Some of the factors that we had initially identified were seen to be important to us, but with an unpredictable outcome in ten years’ time. For each of these uncertain factors we built a correlation matrix looking to see how they related to each other. For example, did one increase, decrease, or remain unaffected by another? Figure 4.10 The intellectual activity to correlate these was one of the hardest of the project. For each factor, we determined whether it was positively correlated against every other (on a scale 1 to 3), negatively, or not at all (0). Then the factors were sorted, giving the list below in Figure 4.11. Some of the factors were inherently unknowable and not causally linked to any of the others – for instance, the occurrence of a major earthquake in the USA was not caused by any of the other factors – though it could contribute to a factor like “more terrorist actions”. The factors which were not linked were called “wild cards”. We found that the best way of treating these was to identify where in the organization the policy for dealing with these should rest, and discussing them, exploring the processes and responsibilities, and getting policies established, rather than building them into the scenarios. We then saw a pattern, in which four themes emerged. 1. The degree of influences/power exerted by governments. Figure 4.11 2. Social values. 3. Consumer behaviour 4. The shape and degree of global trade. The major ranges of uncertainties could be grouped into these four broad headings i.e.
BUILDING A STORYLINE
While having reached a set of themes helped us, it would not have been enough to communicate either to headquarters staff or to management. To provide hooks for engagement we adopted two illumination aids: So for instance a pair of alternative answers to an uncertainty about the style of marketing, either “consumer marketing dominates” vs “business to business marketing” (see Figure 4.22) became in the scenarios: “Consumer style marketing techniques dominate, smaller boutique style companies are successful. Added value through innovation and marketing as seen by the customer. Products and operational services – e.g. help desks, maintenance – are marketed to those who will use them. Purchasing decisions will be made by the individuals for themselves or possibly on behalf of a small group, whether for business or leisure use. This applies for smaller new systems too, driven by cost factors. Only for large infrastructure projects, and complex roll-outs, are business-to-business marketing techniques used. Innovation in products and marketing are mostly introduced by small companies and quickly copied or bought out by the global players. Innovation in marketing and distribution is as important as innovations in technology. Small boutique style companies specialize – may be globally – in detailed knowledge of an area, and establish presence through electronic marketing and word of mouth. Advertising over the network subsidises payment for content. Outsourcing of information systems is booming as many organizations find that managing information system is a management distraction. Start-ups using facilities in Asia dominate this market through their front men in North America.” The “business to business” polarity became: “Business to business marketing style across the information industry. Long term customer-supplier relationships are cemented through frame agreements and loyalty schemes. The big full-range vendors dominate the Fortune 1000 and government, using direct and indirect channels. Outsourcing is concentrated in these organizations, and profit margins are vanishingly thin, with the full range vendors taking their profits on hardware and software supply Smaller companies are served by small value added resellers who supply hardware and software primarily based on price criteria. Individual consumers find that vendors regard them as poor relations”. We discuss the early indicators below. All in the name We believe that one reason that this project worked better than our 1993 project was that we came up with names for the scenarios, which described the essence of what they were about. The names had to act as metaphors so that when we were talking about a scenario we could use the name as an evocative shortcut, to give people an instant and intuitive picture of each scenario, thus providing a framework into which detail could be added. At first we toyed with names like “Chinese meals” versus “Hungarian Hot Pot”. The Hungarian Hot Pot was stodgy and could describe the scenario without much innovation, while the Chinese meal could apply to the more short-lived scenario. However, these were not really satisfactory and after much discussion and brainstorming the names emerged: Coral Reef and Deep Sea. Figure 4.13 They seemed to fit well because of the intuitive behaviour which each describes. The Coral Reef world is very diverse, with much visible activity and complex food chains. There are many small fish. The Deep Sea world is less diverse, with fewer species of mainly larger fish. It is a simpler world in many ways. And for people who have reflexes formed on land, both the Coral Reef and Deep Sea can be dangerous places unless the reflexes are retrained: for instance, the natural response to danger under the water is to hold the breath and come to the surface. But if you have been breathing from a scuba tank, this is a way to die painlessly with an ascent of even less than 10 feet. The moral is: training for the new environment is what scenarios are about, i.e. trying out for a possible future environment. INFORMATION MARKETS IN 2005 In creating the scenarios we developed separate storylines for each. This took as much effort as the step to correlate the factors: and it needed a divergent style of thinking rather than pure analysis. The storylines and early indicators proved to be the second major tools for communication and engagement, after the names of the scenarios. Figure 4.15 is a summary of the characteristics of the Coral Reef, and Figure 4.14 of the Deep Sea world. Figure : 4.14 Figure : 4.15 We then applied these scenarios to the Information Industry. Coral Reef Under the Coral Reef scenario the demanding and sophisticated customer outsources or purchases systems integration because of the potential for IT to change the business and is interested in new technology. Coral Reef is largely deregulated or self-regulated, while Deep Sea is regulated. Coral Reef exploits energy and innovation, with growth from Asia and new businesses in new areas. An example of the differences is how information would be supplied to customers over networks. In Coral Reef, a multiplicity of devices would connect to a number of competing services, with price wars and confusion (see Figure 4.16). Figure 4.16 We thought that early indicators of a world behaving like the Coral Reef could include: 1. Bill deregulating US markets passed in 1995, European countries meeting their deadlines, and Japan deregulating in 1999. 2. AT&T sells NCR, or Siemens sells SNI, or Olivetti sells the PC business. 3. Spin-offs increase relative to mergers in the media business. 4. Digital sells its semiconductor business to Texas Investments (TI), and TI sells its software business to computer Automation. 5. Semiconductor market share (for companies with HQs) in Asia Pacific (including Japan) exceeds that of Europe and North America in 1996. 6. Fabrication capacity in Asia (excluding Japan) exceeds that in Japan, Europe and North America combined by 2000. 7. US and China establish a trade treaty in 1996. 8. Microsoft and Intel have been constrained by anti-trust legislation. Deep Sea In this scenario, we see Europe and the US reacting somewhat negatively to changes in world balance. Under Deep Sea, the demanding and sophisticated customers outsource or purchase systems integration because it is not their core business. They are interested in a full range supplier talking the risk and reducing cost. What the consumer might see in the Deep Sea world is shown in Figure 4.17. Here the range of offering smaller, with a lower bandwidth offering as the norm – so less possibility of movies on –line. The devices would be packaged with the network, and only work with one service provider. Early indicators of Deep Sea could include: 1. The early indicators of Coral Reef are not seen, e.g. the number of mergers increases relative to the number of spin-offs. 2. UK, Spain, & Denmark isolated at the 1996 Maastricht conference. US imposes punitive tax on a very visible Japanese export. 3. Successful lobbying of European governments to introduce tough new penalties to combat crime. 4. Windows 95 fails to meet expected shipments in Europe, compared to its take up in the US. But of course, neither scenario is a forecast, and so neither will happen. There will be elements of both scenarios in the actual outcome, while they may also co-exist in different segments and geographies, For example, the US may be more like Coral Reef while Europe may be more Deep Sea-like. Figure 4.17 COMMUNICATING THE SCENARIOS In communicating the scenarios, we have already discussed the importance of a name which convey the right picture and associations for the scenarios. Additionally, we prepared and circulated back to the group of managers that we had interviewed:
We gave briefings to a number of groups inside ICL, e.g. the Policy & Strategy Network of corporate planners, the Client Managers and the Board, and included questions relating to dealing with uncertainty in the planning guidelines.
|