Report R2.7 Probability, Induction, and the Logic of Research (Part II) Seminar Leader: D. P. Dash, XIMB dpdash[at]ximb.ac.in One way to look at the development of any discipline is through an investigation of the problems that are examined by it. These problems could be two-fold. One set of problems is created by the discipline itself. They characteristically arise from inconsistencies within the axiomatic space of the discipline. The second set of problems is forced upon the discipline from outside its boundaries. These problems originate through practical needs or when predictions made on the basis of existing theories do not hold good. The capability of a discipline to generate its own problems is most often an indication of its sophistication. The problem of induction is basic to human inquiry in any discipline. The Scottish philosopher, David Hume (1711-1776) discussed the difficulty of logically justifying general conclusions based on specific experiences. Karl Raimund Popper (1902-1994), the Austrian-born British philosopher, formulated Hume's philosophical analysis in terms of two problems -- the logical and the psychological. The logical problem asserts that we cannot justifiably reason from instances of which we have experience to other instances of which we have no experience. The psychological problem questions why people believe and have expectations following the above mode of reasoning. Hume concludes that this was because of custom or habit. Popper distinguishes between "observation statements" and "theory statements." He, like Hume, asserts that no number of observation statements would enable us to justify that a theory statement is true. However, he claims that on the basis of the truth or falsity of certain observation statements, we can justify that a particular theory statement is false. This constitutes an explanation of how scientific knowledge progresses. This method of falsification can be used to choose among a number of competing alternative theories. Popper introduces the idea of "degree of corroboration" to explain this further. This is an evaluation of the past performance of the theory and the tests it has withstood vis-à-vis other theories. Any new theory should have succeeded not only where its predecessors failed but where they had succeeded as well. In this sense we can affirm that the new theory is better than the old one since it has achieved a higher degree of corroboration. It should be noted that the superiority of the theory with a higher degree of corroboration is rooted in the past. It does not make us capable of reliably predicting the future. This incapability is sometimes viewed as a deterrent to the scientist who seeks the absolute reliability of his/her findings. However a theoretician may well be encouraged to propose new theories again and again in the hope that one of them might survive. What prompts us to rely on our pragmatic belief in the results of induction is our instinctive need for regularities. Is this necessarily irrational? Popper argues that a selection of the best-corroborated theory is rationally sound as there is no better alternative to it at a particular time. Notes Some useful links on the problem of induction: http://www.faragher.freeserve.co.uk/induct.htm http://dieoff.org/page126.htm http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/stanford/entries/popper Reference Popper, Karl R. (1972). Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach (Chapter 1, "Conjectural Knowledge: My Solution to the Problem of Induction"). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Xavier Institute of Management, Xavier Square, Bhubaneswar 751013, India Research World (ISSN 0974-2379) http://www1.ximb.ac.in/RW.nsf/pages/Home |
